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In order to reject the notion that information is always about something, the “It from Bit” idea
relies on the nonexistence of a realistic framework that might underly quantum theory. This essay
develops the case that there is a plausible underlying reality: one actual spacetime-based history,
although with behavior that appears strange when analyzed dynamically (one time-slice at a time).
By using a simple model with no dynamical laws, it becomes evident that this behavior is actually
quite natural when analyzed “all-at-once” (as in classical statistical mechanics). The “It from Bit”
argument against a spacetime-based reality must then somehow defend the importance of dynamical
laws, even as it denies a reality on which such fundamental laws could operate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information, not so long ago, used to always mean
knowledge about something. Even today, under lay-
ers of abstraction, that’s still the usual meaning.1
Sure, an agent can be informed of a string of bits
(via some signal) without knowing what the bits re-
fer to, but at minimum the agent has been informed
about the physical signal itself.
Quantum theory, however, has led many to ques-
tion this once-obvious connection between knowl-
ege/information and an underlying reality. Not only
is our information about a quantum system indis-
tinguishable from our best physical description, but
we have failed to come up with a realistic account of
what might be going on independent of our knowl-
edge. This blurring between information and reality
has led to a confusion as to which is more funda-
mental.
The remarkable “It from Bit” idea [2] that in-
formation is more fundamental than reality is mo-
tivated by standard quantum theory, but this is a
bit suspicious. After all, there’s a long “instrumen-
talist” tradition of only using what we can mea-
sure to describe quantum entities, rejecting outright
any story of what might be happening when we’re
not looking. Using a theory that only comprises
1 The technical concept of Shannon Information is distinct
from this everyday meaning, although they are often erro-
neously conflated. Shannon Information is perhaps better
termed “source compressibility” or “channel capacity” (in
different contexts), and is a property of (real) sources or
channels. [1] This essay utilizes the everyday meaning of
“information”: an agent’s knowledge.
our knowledge of measurement outcomes to justify
knowledge as fundamental is almost like wearing
rose-tinted glasses to justify that the world is tinted
red.
But any such argument quickly runs into the coun-
terargument: “Then answer the question: What is
the (objective) reality that our information of quan-
tum systems is actually about?” Without an answer
to this question (that differs from our original in-
formation), “It from Bit” proponents can perhaps
claim to win the argument by default. The only
proper rebuttal is to demonstrate that there is some
plausible underlying reality, after all.
This is generally thought to be an impossible task,
having been ruled out by various “no-go” theorems
[3–5]. But such theorems are only as solid as their
premises, and they all presume a particular sort of
independence between the past and the future. This
presumption may be valid in a universe that uses dy-
namical laws to evolve some initial state into future
states, but if “The Universe is Not a Computer” [6],
there is a natural alternative to this dynamic view-
point. As argued in last year’s essay, instead of the
universe solving itself one time-slice at a time, it’s
possible that it only looks coherent when solved “all-
at-once”.
This essay aims to demonstrate how this all-at-
once perspective naturally recasts our supposedly-
complete information about quantum systems
into incomplete information about an underlying,
spacetime-based reality. After some motivation in
the next section, a simple model will demonstrate
how the all-at-once perspective works for purely spa-
tial systems (without time). Then, applying the
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2same perspective to spacetime systems will reveal
a framework that can plausibly serve as a realistic
explanation for quantum phenomena.
The result of this analysis will be to dramatically
weaken the “It from Bit” idea, showing that it’s pos-
sible to have an underlying reality, even in the case
of quantum theory. We may still choose to reject
this option, but the mere fact that it is on the ta-
ble might encourage us not to redefine information
as fundamental – especially as it becomes clear just
how poorly-informed we actually are.
II. INSTANTS VS. SPACETIME
The case for discarding dynamics in favor of an
all-at-once analysis is best made by analyzing quan-
tum theory [6], but it’s also possible to frame this
argument using the other pillar of modern physics:
Einstein’s theory of relativity. The relevant insight
is that there is no objective way to slice up spacetime
into instants, so we must not assign fundamental sig-
nificance to any particular slice.
Figure 1 is a standard spacetime diagram (with
one dimension of space suppressed). If run forward
in time like a movie, this diagram represents two
spatial objects that begin at a common past (C.P.)
and then move apart. But if viewed all-at-once, the
figure instead shows two orange “worldtubes” that
intersect in the past. In relativity, as we are about
to see, it is best to analyze this picture all-at-once.
The most counter-intuitive feature of special rela-
tivity is that there is no objective “now”. Simulta-
neous events for one observer are not simultaneous
for another. No observer is right or wrong; “now”
is merely subjective, not an element of reality. An
illustration of this can be seen in Figure 1. Observer
#1 has a “now” that slices the worldtubes into two
white ovals, while Observer #2 has a “now” that
slices the worldtubes into two black ovals. Clearly,
they disagree.
This fact implies that any dynamical movie made
from a spacetime diagram will incorporate a subjec-
tive choice of how to slice it up. One way to purge
this subjectivity is to simply view a spacetime dia-
gram as a single 4D block. After all, with no ob-
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FIG. 1: A spacetime diagram, demonstrating the
unreality of “now”. (See text.)
jective “now”, there is no objective line between the
past and the future, meaning there can be no objec-
tive difference between them.
Such a claim is counter-intuitive, but this is a cen-
tral lesson of relativity. The only difference between
the future and the past, in this view, is subjective:
we don’t (yet) know any of our future. Arguments
such as “But the future isn’t real now” are no more
meaningful than arguing “Over there isn’t real right
here”.
A more reasonable fallback for the dynamicist is
not to deny that spacetime can be viewed as a single
4D block, but rather to note that if dynamical equa-
tions govern the universe2 then any complete space-
like slice suffices to generate the rest of the block
(via dynamical equations). So while no one slice is
special, they’re all equally valid inputs from which
the full universe can be recovered. Taken to an ex-
treme, this viewpoint leads to the notion that the 4D
block is filled with redundant permuted copies of the
same 3D slice. It also forbids a number of solutions
allowed by general relativity, spacetime geometries
warped to such an extent that they only make sense
all-at-once.
The other problem with this sliced perspective is
that it all but gives up on objectivity. Even if it’s
2 Along with other subtleties, such as the existence of Cauchy
data.
3possible to generate the block from a single slice (a
point I’ll dispute later on), how can one 3D slice
truly generate the others if it is a subjective choice?
In Figure 1, if both the white ovals and the black
ovals are different complete descriptions of the same
reality, it’s the 4D worldtubes they generate that
makes them consistent. The clearest objective real-
ity requires a bigger picture.
This point becomes even clearer when one in-
troduces (subjective) uncertainty. Suppose each
of the worldtubes in Figure 1 represent a (tempo-
rally extended) shoebox, each containing a single
shoe. Also suppose that you knew the shoes were
a matched pair, but not which shoe (R or L) was
in which box (1 or 2). To represent your infor-
mation about the two boxes after they had sepa-
rated (say, the white ovals in Figure 1), you might
use an equal-probability mix of both possibilities:
Smix = [50%(L1R2), 50%(L2R1)]. This is not a po-
tential state of reality, but a state in a larger “con-
figuration space” that weights possibilities that do
fit in spacetime. Note that having less knowledge
forces a more complicated description, even if the
underlying reality is assuredly either L1R2 or L2R1.
For these restricted-knowledge situations, the all-
at-once viewpoint is invaluable if we are to make
sense of what is going on when we open a shoebox
and learn which shoe is inside. If we take the dy-
namic view that we need only keep track of the 3D
white ovals in Figure 1 to describe the entire 4D sys-
tem, then Smix might seem to give us everything we
need; from it we can compute outcome probabilities
and the correlations between the two boxes. Upon
learning that (say) the left shoe is in box 1, we can
even update our knowledge of the 3D state S to the
appropriate [100%(L1R2)]. But what is lost in this
viewpoint is the mechanism for the updating; if our
entire description is that of the 3D white ovals, this
updating process might appear nonlocal, as if some
spooky influence at box 1 is influencing the reality
over at box 2.
Sure, we know that nothing spooky is going on
in the case of shoes, but that’s only because we al-
ready know there’s an underlying reality of which
Smix represents (subjective) information. If the ex-
istence of an underlying reality is doubt (as in quan-
tum theory), then analysis of the 3D state Smix can-
not address whether anything spooky is happening.
To resolve that question, one has to look at the en-
tire 4D structure. All at once.
In the all-at-once viewpoint, after finding the left
shoe in box 1 we update our local knowledge to L1
(updating occurs when we learn new information).
But thinking in 4D, we also update our knowledge
of the past ; we now know that that L1 back in the
C.P. This in turn implies R2 back in the C.P, and
this allows us to update our knowledge of R2 in the
present. It’s the continuous link, via the past, that
proves that we did not change the contents of box
2; it contained the right shoe all along. Throw away
the analysis of the 4D link, and there’s no way to be
sure.
Before moving on, it’s worth noting that this
classical story cannot explain all quantum correla-
tions; in fact, it’s exactly the story ruled out by a
no-go theorem [3]. Such theorems generally start
from the classical premise that we can assign sub-
jective probabilities pi to possible 3D realities, Wi.
States of classical information then naturally take
the form S = [p1(W1), p2(W2), ..., pN (WN )], a func-
tion on 3N -dimensional configuration space. (Note
the probabilities are all subjective; only one par-
ticular W is real; the rest are not.) The quantum
no-go theorems have proven that such a state can-
not explain quantum measurements without some
classically-impossible feature, such as negative prob-
abilities.
The standard thinking is that since any workable
version of S cannot be classical information, it must
be a new kind of reality in its own right. Effectively,
the standard view3 extends reality from spacetime
to configuration space. But an alternative option,
explored below, is that reality merely requires an
extension from 3D to 4D, along with an all-at-once
analysis. At this point it’s probably not obvious how
anything might change if the W ’s spanned 4D space-
time, but that’s because the standard dynamical
3 Including both deBroglie-Bohm [7] and Everettian [8] ap-
proaches.
4viewpoint makes any such extension trivial. (Thanks
to dynamics, all the interesting information is always
encoded in a 3D slice). Exploring this option there-
fore requires jettisoning dynamics.
Still, old habits die hard; it’s difficult to think
about time without also thinking in terms of dy-
namical equations. The 4D block is a good start,
but it’s time to demonstrate how it can be used to
make physical predictions. Fortunately, it’s a stan-
dard procedure, so straightforward that it’s nearly
trivial.
III. A DYNAMICS-FREE MODEL
Physicists know how to do physics without dy-
namics, because we can analyze 3D systems for
which there are no dynamics, by definition. A partic-
ularly useful approach is found in classical statistical
mechanics, because in that case we never know the
exact microscopic details, allowing us to deal with
restricted knowledge situations.
The basic approach works like this. First, deter-
mine the possible underlying realities; call each one
a “microstate” Wi. The key next step
4 is to assign
each Wi an equal a priori probability, pi. (Initially
treat all possible states as equally likely.) If we learn
new information – say, that W9 is ruled out – we set
p9 = 0 and renormalize the remaining probabilities
such that they sum to 1. Finally, we can determine
the probability that the system has any particular
feature by simply adding the probabilities of the mi-
crostates with that feature. One could introduce
dynamics on top of this framework, but it’s not a
logical necessity.
For a simple example that will prove particularly
relevant to quantum theory, consider Figure 2. Each
circle (perhaps a coin) can be in the state heads (H)
or tails (T), and every line connects two circles. Each
line has one of three internal colors; red, green or
blue, but these colors are unobservable (they can
sometimes be deduced, but not directly measured).
4 Sometimes known as the “fundamental postulate of statis-
tical mechanics”.
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FIG. 2: Two geometries of a model, in which each
circle can be Heads (H) or Tails (T). There are two
line colors that connect matching circles (HH,TT)
and a third line color to connect opposite circles
(HT, TH). The interesting case is where one does
not know whether the geometry is that of 2a or 2b.
The model’s only “law” is that red lines must con-
nect opposite-state circles (H−T or T −H), while
blue and green lines must connect similar-state cir-
cles (H−H or T−T ).5
Consider the following puzzle in the statistical me-
chanics framework: In Figure 2a, if it is known that
the bottom circle is H, what is the probability that
the two circles in the dotted box are in the same
state? It’s easy enough to work out (see the Ap-
pendix for details) that there are 4 microstates where
these two circles are HH, 2 microstates for HT , 2
for TH, and only 1 for TT . By assigning each of
these 9 states an equal probability, it should be evi-
dent that there is a 5/9 chance those two circles are
the same, and a 4/9 chance that they’re different.
For Figure 2b, the same puzzle is trickier be-
cause now there’s a fourth circle. In this case, the
same style of analysis (in the Appendix) reveals that
the different geometry changes the probabilities. In
place of a 5:4 probability ratio, here one finds a 25:16
ratio.
The most interesting example is a further restric-
tion where one does not know whether the actual
geometry is that of Figure 2a or 2b. Specifically,
one knows that the bottom circle is heads, and that
the next two circles are connected, but not whether
5 This is effectively a much-simplified version of the Ising
Model.
5a fourth circle is connected (2b), or whether it is not
(2a).
This is not to say there is no fact of the mat-
ter; there is some particular geometry – it’s just
unknown. This is not quite the same as the un-
known circles or links (which also have some par-
ticular state), because this model provides no clues
as to how to calculate the probability of a geom-
etry. All allowable states may be equally likely,
but that doesn’t help us if we don’t know which
states are allowable in the first place. With this
further-restricted knowledge, we would most natu-
rally use an even higher-level configuration space to
describe the probability of similar states in the dot-
ted box, something like: S?=[If 2a then 5/9; If 2b
then 25/(25+16)].6
The next section will explore a crucial mistake
that would lead one to conclude that no underly-
ing reality exists for this statistical-mechanics-based
model, despite the fact that an underlying reality
does indeed exist (by construction). Then, by ap-
plying the above logic to a dynamics-free scenario
in space and time, we’ll see how we are making this
same mistake in quantum theory.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL
A. The Independence Fallacy
Given the previous model, one might reasonably
want to analyze a “slice” of the system (the dotted
box) independent from the rest. But this can only be
done by expanding the description of the box such
that it includes each possible external geometry – ef-
fectively removing the “ifs” from S?. Then, one can
later use the actual geometry to extract the appro-
priate probability from the larger state space (either
5/9 or 25/41).
But this new perspective becomes quite mistaken
if one further demands that the state of reality in
the dotted box must be independent of the external
6 There is nothing quite like this higher-level space in quan-
tum theory, but as we’ll see, that’s the point.
geometry. It’s obviously not true for this model, but
given such an “Independence Fallacy” one would be
led to some interesting conclusions. Namely, this
all-possible-geometry state space would seem to be
irreducible to a classical probability distribution over
realistic microstates.
Given the Independence Fallacy, the argument
would go like this: Geometry 2a implies a 5/9 prob-
ability of similar circles, while geometry 2b implies
a 25/41 probability. But since the state must be in-
dependent of the geometry, the question “Are the
two circles the same?” cannot be assigned a coher-
ent probability. And if it cannot be answered, such
a question should not even be asked.
This, of course, is nonsense: such a question can
be asked in this model, but the answer depends on
the geometry. It is the Independence Fallacy which
leads to a denial of an underlying reality – stemming
from a motivation to describe a slice of a system
independently from what lies outside.
B. Information-Based Updating
Leaving aside the Independence Fallacy, it should
be clear how the S? description of the dotted box
should be updated upon learning new information.
For example, if an agent learned that the geometry
was in fact that of Figure 2b, a properly-updated de-
scription would simply be a 25/41 probability that
the two coins were the same. And upon learning
the actual values of the coins (say, HT ), further up-
dating would occur; HT would then have a 100%
probability.
But the central point is that some information-
updating naturally occurs when one learns the geom-
etry of the model, even without any revealed circles.
And because this is a realistic model (with some real,
underlying state), the information updating has no
corresponding feature in the coin’s objective reality.
It is a subjective process, performed as some agent
gains new information.
6C. Introducing Time
The above model was presented as a static system
in two spatial dimensions. The only place that time
entered the analysis was in the updating process in
the previous subsection, but this subjective updat-
ing had no relation to anything objective about the
system. Indeed, one could give different agents in-
formation in a different logical order, leading to dif-
ferent updating. Both orders would be unrelated to
any objective evolution of the system; after all, the
system is static.
Still, an objective time coordinate can be intro-
duced in a trivial manner: simply redefine the model
such that one of the spatial axes in Figure 2 repre-
sents time instead of space. Specifically, suppose
that the vertical axis is time (past on the bottom,
future on the top). It is crucial not to introduce
dynamics along with time; one point of the model
was to show how to analyze systems without dy-
namics. And since this analysis has already been
performed, we don’t need to do it again. The dot-
ted box now represents an instantaneous slice, and
the same state-counting logic will lead to exactly the
same probabilities as the purely spatial case.
One might be tempted to propose reasons why this
space-time model is fundamentally different from the
original space-space model, perhaps assuming the
existence of dynamical laws. Such laws would break
the analogy, but they are not part of the model.
Besides, the previous section is an existence proof
that such a system can be analyzed in this manner,
which is all that is needed for the below conclusions.
It is logically possible to assign an equal probability
to each temporally-extended microstate (or more in-
tuitively, “microhistory”) and then make associated
predictions.
Sure, it’s an open question whether there is some
other way to analyze systems without dynamics, or
if this approach has any chance of actually making
good predictions. But this approach is empirically
successful for spatial systems without dynamics, and
the early indications are that it looks promising for
temporal systems as well [9].
One unusual feature of the original model should
now be obvious. Not knowing the spatial geome-
try (say, 2a or 2b) was an artificial restriction. But
it’s quite natural not to know the future, and once
the vertical axis represents time, it’s obvious why an
agent might be uncertain whether the fourth circle
would ever materialize. But this does not break the
analogy between the spatial and temporal models.
Sure, we tend to learn about things in temporal or-
der, but it’s not a formal requirement; we can film a
movie of a system and watch it backwards, or even
have spatial slices of a system delivered to us one
at a time.7 The link between information-order and
temporal-order is merely typical, not a logical neces-
sity.
In this temporal context, it’s also more under-
standable how one might fall into the Independence
Fallacy. If we expect the future to be generated from
the past via some dynamical laws, then we would
also expect the probabilities we assign to the past to
be independent of the future experimental geometry.
But without dynamics, if we assign every microhis-
tory an equal probability, the standard information-
updating that made sense in the spatial case also
makes sense in the temporal case. When we learn
about the experimental geometry of the future, this
all-at-once analysis typically updates our probabilis-
tic assessment of the past.
V. QUANTUM REALITY
The modern arguments against an underlying re-
ality for quantum systems typically involve hard-to-
summarize “no-go theorems”, but the central issues
do not require anything so difficult, and indeed were
well known to the founders of quantum mechanics.
A useful framework is the famous Double Slit Ex-
periment, which in Richard Feynman’s words reveals
the “central mystery” of quantum theory. [11]
In Figure 3, a source (at the bottom) creates a
single photon that passes up through a pair of slits.8
7 As in the final section of [10].
8 The vertical axis is performing double-duty as both time
and a second spatial axis.
7The classical concept most closely related to pho-
tons are classical electromagnetic waves/fields, but
photons behave in a way that disagrees with the dy-
namical Maxwell equations which govern such fields.
(A strike against dynamics.) Namely, photons al-
ways seem to be measured in particle-like chunks,
rather than spread out as classically predicted. For
example, when a lens (or two) images the slits (as in
Figure 3a), one always finds that the photon-wave
went through one slit or the other.
(a) (b)
FIG. 3: Two geometries of a double slit
experiment, in which a single photon passes
through a pair of slits. 3a) Lenses and (black)
detectors measure which slit the photon passes
through; 3b) A screen records a photon that
contributes to a two-slit interference pattern.
And yet it appears that photons do spread out,
at least between measurements, if one considers the
experiment in Figure 3b. Here a screen records
the interference pattern produced by waves pass-
ing through both slits, built up one photon at a
time. In the many-photon limit, this pattern is pre-
dicted by classical dynamics only if the waves pass
through both slits and interfere. Since each individ-
ual photon conforms to this pattern (not landing in
dark fringes), it seems evident that each photon also
passes through both slits.
Where reality seems to fail here is the descrip-
tion of the photon at the slits – one slice of the full
spacetime diagram. In 3a the photon seems to go
through only one slit; in 3b it seems to go through
both. And since the status of the photon at the slits
is “obviously” independent of the future experimen-
tal geometry, it follows that the actual location(s)
of the photon-wave at the slits cannot be assigned a
coherent probability.
Except that this is exactly the Independence Fal-
lacy! Compare Figure 2 (temporal version) to Figure
3; they are quite analogous. In 2a and 3a the right
and left branches stay separate; in 2b and 3b the
geometry begins in the same way, but then allows
recombination. Following the above logic, avoiding
the Independence Fallacy allows a coherent under-
lying reality for the double-slit experiment.
The answer is something like [If 3a then
50%(left),50%(right); If 3b then 100%(both)]. Upon
learning the future geometry, an agent would update
her assessment of the past probabilities, just as be-
fore. Once this updating occurs, a classical reality is
revealed. (For 3b, it is perfectly realistic to have a
wave go through both slits.) It only looks strange if
you don’t analyze it all-at-once, or attempt to map
this process onto a story with dynamical evolution.
Unlike other resolutions of the double-slit experi-
ment, this resolution naturally resolves more prob-
lematic situations. The no-go theorems against real-
istic models all use the Independence Fallacy in one
form or another.9 The typical assumption is that it’s
always fair to describe spatial slices independently
from the future experimental geometry. But if one
updates past probabilities upon learning which mea-
surement a system will encounter, the premises be-
hind these theorems are explicitly violated.
Even so, this complicated updating of probabili-
ties on different time-slices is not the most natural
picture. Relativity tells us that the slicing is sub-
jective; the objective structure lies in the 4D space-
time block. It is here where the microhistories re-
side, and to be realistic, one of these microhistories
must really be there. A physics experiment is then
about learning which microhistory actually occurs,
via information-based updating; we gain relevant in-
formation upon preparation, measurement setting,
and measurement itself. And the best way to coher-
ently describe this updating is with an all-at-once
analysis.
9 Outcome independence [12], preparation independence [5],
etc.
8VI. CONCLUSIONS
If there is a plausible reality underlying quan-
tum theory, the “It from Bit” idea looks wrong-
headed. The microhistory-reality proposed here de-
mands that one gives up the intuitive universe-as-
computer story of dynamical time evolution, so one
may still choose to cling to dynamics, voiding this
analysis. But in the process, one is also rejecting
a spacetime-based reality. Is this a fair trade-off?
Is dynamics really so crucial that it’s worth delving
into some nebulous “informational immaterialism”
[1] or elevating configuration space into some weird
reality in its own right? And why should dynam-
ical laws be so important if one is giving up on a
fundamental reality in the first place?
After all, there are excellent reasons for dropping
dynamics, the quantum no-go theorems being prime
examples. We also have the beautiful path inte-
gral where all possible histories must be considered
(whether they obey dynamical laws or not; see, e.g.,
[13]). And is it really so crucial that we live in a
universe where nothing interesting happens in the
time-direction, where everything about the present
was encoded in some initial cosmic wavefunction?
It’s not such a stretch to view our world as one
possibility of infinitely many, unshackled from strict
predeterministic rules.
After giving up on reality via the Independence
Fallacy, the standard quantum story ironically re-
sponds by making almost everything interdepen-
dent in some strange configuration space. (Al-
most everything, just not the future or the past.)
The simpler alternative proposed here is simply to
link everything together in standard 4D spacetime.
This casts our information in the classical form:
S = [p1(W1), p2(W2), ..., pN (WN )], with the crucial
caveat that the W ’s are now microhistories, span-
ning 4D instead of 3D. So long as one does not addi-
tionally impose dynamical laws, there is no theorem
that one of these microhistories cannot be real.
Still, qualitative arguments are one thing; the
analogy between the above model and the double slit
experiment can only be pushed so far. And one can
go too far in the no-dynamics direction: consider-
ing all histories, as in the path integral, would lead
to the conclusion that the future would be almost
completely uncorrelated with the past, contradict-
ing macroscopic observations.
But this approach can be made much more quan-
titative. The key is to only consider a large natural
subset of possible histories,10 such that classical dy-
namics is usually recovered as a general guideline in
the many-particle limit. Better yet, for at least one
model, the structure of quantum probabilities natu-
rally emerges.11 And as with any deeper-level the-
ory that purports to explain higher-level behavior,
intriguing new predictions are also indicated. [9]
Even if the arguments presented in this essay
are not a convincing reason to discard fundamen-
tal dynamical equations, they nevertheless serve as
a strong rebuttal to the “It from Bit” proponents.
Whether or not one wants to give up dynamics, the
point is that one can give up dynamics, in which case
quantum information can plausibly be about some-
thing real. Instead of winning the argument by de-
fault, then, “It from Bit” proponents now need to
argue that it’s better to give up reality. Everyone
else need simply embrace entities that fill ordinary
spacetime – no matter how you slice it.
10 Those for which the total Lagrangian density is always zero.
11 The Born rule can be derived for measurements on an ar-
bitrary spin state in reasonable limits [9].
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APPENDIX
The model in Figure 2 (reproduced below) has
the following rules. Each circle can be in the state
heads (H) or tails (T), and each line connects two
circles. Each line has one of three internal colors;
red (R), green (G), or blue (B), but these colors
are unobservable. The model’s only “law” is that
red lines must connect opposite-state circles (H−T
or T−H), while blue and green lines must connect
similar-state circles (H−H or T−T ).
When analyzing the state-space, the key is to re-
member that connecting links between same-state
circles have two possible internal colors (G or B),
while links between opposite-state circles only have
one possible color (R). Combined with the equal a
priori probability of each complete microstate (both
links and circles), this means that for an isolated 2-
circle system, the circles are twice as likely to be the
same as they are to be different.
H/T ? H/T ?
H(a)
H/T ? H/T ?
H
H/T ?
(b)
In Figure 2a, given that the bottom circle is H,
there are 4 different microstates compatible with an
H on the left and an H on the right. This is be-
cause there are two links, and they can each be ei-
ther blue or green. (Specifically, listing the states
of the three circles and the two links, the 4 possible
“HH” microstates are HBHBH, HBHGH, HGHBH,
and HGHGH.) According to the fundamental pos-
tulate of statistical mechanics, an HH will be four
times as likely as a TT, for which only red links are
possible (TRHRT). The full table for Figure 2a is:
Left Right Microstates
H H 4
H T 2
T H 2
T T 1
2a Total: 9
Figure 2b is more complex, in that there is now
a fourth circle at the top. The fact that there are
4 links also means that there are 16 different mi-
crostates corresponding to all H’s (4 green or blue
links, 24 = 16), but only one microstate correspond-
ing to the case with T’s on the right and left and
another H on the top (4 red links). The 2b table is:
Left Right Top Microstates
H H H 16
H H T 4
T H H 4
T H T 4
H T H 4
H T T 4
T T H 1
T T T 4
2b Total: 41
However, since we are not interested in the status
of the top circle in this model, the relevant numbers
are the total number of ways in which one might have
(say) an H on the left and right. To get the total
number of such states, one simply sums the first two
rows of the previous table. In other words, there are
20 different states that have HH in the dotted box
of Figure 2b; 16 with H on top and 4 with T on top.
The more useful 2b table is therefore:
Left Right Microstates
H H 20
H T 8
T H 8
T T 5
2b Total: 41
Notice there are 25 ways in which the right and
left circles match, vs. 16 ways in which they do not
match. This contrasts with a 5:4 ratio for Figure 2a.
